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Abstract— We investigate how ideas from the International
Environmental Agreement (IEA) literature can be applied to
the problem of space debris mitigation. The problem of space
debris is similar to other international environmental problems
in that there is a potential for a tragedy of the commons
effect–individual nations bear all the cost of their mitigation
measures but share only a fraction of the benefit. Consequently,
nations have a tendency to underinvest in mitigation. Coalitions
of nations, brought together by IEAs, have the potential to
lessen the tragedy of the commons effect by pooling the
costs and benefits of mitigation. This work brings together
two recent modeling advances: i) a game theoretic model for
studying the potential gains from IEA cooperation between
nations with asymmetric costs and benefits, ii) an orbital
debris model that gives the societal cost that specific actions,
such as failing to deorbit an inactive satellite, have on the
environment. We combine these two models with empirical
launch share data for a “proof of concept” of an IEA for a
single mitigation measure, deorbiting spacecraft at the end of
operational lifetime. Simulations of all possible coalitions for
a proxy set of 12 asymmetric nations suggest the possibility
that stable coalitions can provide significant deorbiting gains
relative to nations acting in the absence of an IEA coalition.
I. PROBLEM STATEMENT
When actions of individuals affect a shared resource,
there is potential for a tragedy of the commons scenario:
individual decision-makers under-invest in protection if they
see only a fraction of the benefits from the investment.
Consequently, a stream of recent literature has sought to
understand how nations can form coalitions to counter the
potential for tragedy of the commons scenarios in protecting
the environment.
Game-theoretic models in the greenhouse gas (GHG),
ozone depletion, and acid rain arenas have shown that when
nations 1) recognize asymmetries of marginal costs and
benefits of mitigation and 2) establish coalitions to transfer
payments to adjust abatement rates, there can be a substantial
increase in global levels of pollution abatement. The size of
the increase is a function of the nature and extent of the
asymmetries [1].
Our initial focus applies the IEA framework to one debris
mitigation measure, post-mission deorbiting of spacecraft,
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using marginal benefits derived from the damage metric
provided by Bradley and Wein (2009) [2], marginal costs
derived from deorbit cost estimates given by Weidemann
(2004) [3], and spacecraft ownership data from the Union
of Concerned Scientist database [4].
II. IEA MODEL FRAMEWORK
A. Overview
Game-theoretic methods are ideally suited to formally
modeling strategic considerations of actors causing trans-
boundary environmental externalities [5].
The fundamental assumption of IEAs is that, given the
lack of an international agency to enforce agreements, they
must be designed to be self-enforcing. “For IEAs to improve
management of shared environmental resources, they must
make it attractive for countries to sign and carry out the
terms of the agreement” [6]. The theory assumes parties act
in their own self-interest to maximize their individual net
profit (i.e., share of benefit from global abatement minus
individual costs of environmental abatement).
In game-theoretic framing, each actor independently att-
empts to find a “best response” to other players’ strategies.
If there is a mutual best response where no player can
benefit by individually deviating from that solution, the game
solution is a “Nash-equilibrium” [7].
In contrast with this “Nash” (here termed “null coalition”)
behavior, game-theoretic research in the IEA domain poses
a “social” optimal or “full-cooperative” [1] behavior that
maximizes global profit summed over all actors. All actors
act in concert as a “full coalition” (also referred to in
the literature as a grand or complete coalition), behaving
as if dictated by a “social hegemon” decreeing individual
abatement levels.
IEA research has focused on evaluating levels of abate-
ment and profit for self-enforcing “partial coalitions” relative
to null coalition and full coalition values under different
assumptions of player characteristics and rules of coalition
formation.
For a partial coalition to be stable (i.e., self-enforcing),
three criteria must be satisfied:
1) Coalition members individually realize a greater be-
nefit under the agreement than they would outside
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(a condition termed “internal stability” in economic
oligopoly literature),
2) Non-members do not perceive an incentive to join
(“external stability”), and
3) Total coalition profit exceeds total payoffs for each
single defector (“coalition stability”) [1].
IEA modeling has used both cooperative (i.e., with a me-
diator) and non-cooperative game-theoretic approaches [8],
with seminal works including the non-cooperative “bench-
mark” model introduced by Barrett [6], Hoel [9], and Carraro
and Siniscalco [10]. A key challenge for IEAs has been
finding mechanisms to overcome incentives for nations to
“free-ride” on the abatement efforts of others [5].
Early research [6] indicated that a partial coalition formed
by identical nations (i.e., each nation having identical cost
functions and benefit functions for abatement) could neither
attain significant membership (no more than three members,
depending on the shape of the marginal benefit and cost
functions) nor improve significantly upon the null coalition
level of global abatement. Later research by Barrett [11],
generalized by McGinty [1], indicated potentially greater
membership and benefits for self-enforcing coalitions relative
to null coalition outcome when there are marginal cost and
benefit asymmetries between actors (nations).
We adopt the non-cooperative game model of McGinty
2007 [1], extending Barrett’s 1997 and 2001 analyses [11]
and [12], to investigate stability and effectiveness of self-
enforcing partial coalitions in contrast with the null coalition
and the full coalition.
The global profit function in all three cases is given in
general form by:
Π =
∑
pii where pii = Bi(Q)− Ci(qi). (1)
While each nation bears the cost of its own abatement, qi,
all nations share the benefits of global abatement, Q.
B. IEA Model (after McGinty (2007))
The profit function for each player is:
pii = bαi
(
aQ− Q
2
2
)
− ciq
2
i
2
(2)
where αi represents share of global benefits, parameters a
and b can be adjusted to reflect how quickly marginal benefits
decrease as abatement increases, and ci is the cost coefficient.
Marginal benefits and costs in this model are linear and
asymmetric.
McGinty’s model computes, in addition to global and
individual abatement and profit for null and full coalition,
corresponding values for each partial coalition chosen from
the power set of all possible coalitions. The model distinguis-
hes abatement and profit for coalition members from that of
non-members.
In a stable partial coalition, members have a collective
profit that is at least as high as the sum of their individual
profits operating alone. The most efficient allocation accor-
ding to cost requires that all nations abate proportionately
with the ratios of their share of global benefit to marginal
cost coefficient. But the efficient level of abatement for a
given member might not result in a higher payoff for an
individual member compared to leaving the coalition.
To overcome this problem, the final step is designing a
transfer payment scheme that optimizes net burden allocation
among members (i.e., required share of total cost).
Those members for whom the required share of abatement
is greater than the abatement they perform pay into a pot;
those for whom the required share is less than that performed
get paid from the pot. Net transfers are zero-sum.
The one necessary requirement for this “burden-sharing”
rule is that it has to be incentive-compatible—i.e., transfers
ensure the profit each nation receives as a coalition member
exceeds that they would outside the coalition. The “burden
sharing” rule is otherwise flexible, allowing for optimization
to maximize:
• Abatement effectiveness
• Membership
• Equity (on a per capita basis, to reflect legacy conside-
rations, etc.)
McGinty proposes an allocation rule that is optimal in that
“transfers are just sufficient to quell any incentive to deviate
from the agreement.” The rule distributes the surplus that
remains “once each coalition member receives their payoff
as a single defector from the IEA ... in proportion to their
benefit [share]-cost ratio.” (pp. 3, 6)
[We provide an overview of McGinty’s treatment of the
partial coalition case in the Appendix and refer the reader to
[1] for details.]
III. APPLICATION TO DEBRIS MITIGATION
As an initial exploration of modeling an IEA for space
debris mitigation, we examine outcomes for parties choosing
a single type of abatement action: whether to equip satellites
with de-orbit capability. We ignore other actions parties
might take to abate debris generation, remove objects from
the environment, or mitigate the effects of debris (e.g., by
increasing spacecraft shielding).
A. Elements of the Model
An IEA model requires the following elements:
• An environmental resource and a pollutant,
• Actors (or, in game parlance, “players”; here, actors are
nations or groups of nations) and actions they do or can
take to affect the environment,
• A model to quantify harm to the environment from
pollutant generation,
• A model to quantify benefits to actors for their own and
others’ abatement of harm, and
• A model to quantify costs to each actor for abating
harm.
We specify the elements as follows for a space debris
mitigation IEA:
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1) Environmental Resource and Pollutant: The environ-
mental resource analyzed here is near-earth space, in particu-
lar, the shell-of-interest (SOI) of high debris flux at 900-1000
km altitude in low-earth orbit (LEO) analyzed by Bradley
and Wein [2]. The pollutant is a subset of orbital objects:
future spacecraft launched but not deorbited after completion
of their operational lifetimes. Potential for collision with
other spacecraft or debris increases the risk of additional
debris generation.
2) Actors and Actions: We recognize the difficulty in
predicting the set of spacecraft owners and their launch rates
to the SOI. Somewhat arbitrarily, we construct a proxy set
of future spacecraft owners derived from nation-states and
international organizations listed in the Union of Concerned
Scientists database of operational spacecraft as launching
spacecraft to low earth orbit (LEO). The nations are identified
by their ranking from 1 (lowest launch rate) through 12
(highest launch rate). For this proxy set of 12 nations,
Figure 1 shows 1) launch rates to LEO for a recent eight-
year period, 2) share of total annual launches, and 3) annual
launch rates to the SOI after scaling total launch rate to that
taken by Bradley and Wein for this SOI (three operational
spacecraft per year) [2].∗
At this point of model development, we ignore issues
arising from some nations’ very low launch rates (e.g., one
every 75 years for two listed nations) and assume these issues
can be addressed by such mechanisms as “issue linkage”
(e.g., linking IEAs for different SOIs), subcoalitions, “pools”
of nations, or financial derivative instruments.
The only abatement action we consider in this preliminary
analysis is deorbiting. We adopt Bradley and Wein’s assump-
tion that deorbiting from the SOI takes place instantaneously.
3) Harm: Bradley and Wein (2009), in the exposition
of their debris environment model, introduce several im-
portant performance metrics relevant to environmental risk
assessment. The model, a mean-field approximation set of
ordinary differential equations, computes rates of change
of spacecraft, rocket bodies, and fragments in a SOI for
T ∈ [0,∞), where 0 is the present. The model categorizes
spacecraft as operational or no longer operational, with or
without deorbit capability; rocket bodies with or without
deorbit capability; and fragments as hazardous or benign in
collision with other objects depending on collision velocity
and fragment characteristics. Parameters for the differential
equations are expectations over the same distributions that
govern an object-by-object simulation. [We provide an over-
view of Bradley and Wein’s 2009 model in Appendix B and
refer the reader to [2] for details.]
The model’s primary metric is “lifetime risk”, “the proba-
bility that a spacecraft launched at time t will be destroyed
(via an intact-intact or catastrophic intact-fragment collision)
while it is still operational” (p. 1376). Figure 2 shows
∗The proxy set reflects adjustments such as grouping ESA and all
European nations into a single entity, taking only a sampling of nations
with lower launch rates, and evenly dividing ownership for spacecraft listed
as having multiple owners. The length of historical launch period follows
practice for long-term debris models [13], [14].
Nation 
(group) 
ID
Launches* to 
LEO from 
7/1/01 to 7/1/09
Share of 
Total
Annual 
Launches to SOI 
(projected)
1 1    0.004 0.013
2 1    0.004 0.013
3 2    0.009 0.027
4 4    0.018 0.053
5 5    0.022 0.066
6 9    0.040 0.120
7 10    0.044 0.133
8 22 5/6 0.101 0.304
9 27    0.120 0.359
10 29    0.129 0.386
11 38 2/3 0.171 0.514
12 76 1/6 0.338 1.013
Total 225 2/3 1.000 3.000
Fig. 1. Projected launch rate to the SOI for a proxy set of spacecraft-
owning nations, sorted low to high (*reflecting shared ownership of some
spacecraft) [derived, with liberties taken, from the UCS database]
Fig. 2. Risk to a spacecraft of catastrophic destruction during its operational
lifetime. [Bradley and Wein 2009, Fig. 4b, reprinted with permission]
“lifetime risk” for an operational spacecraft launched at the
present epoch in the SOI given a baseline set of parameters
(launch rates, existing debris flux, spacecraft characteristics,
fraction of spacecraft deorbited, etc.). Risk increases at a
modest rate for the next several hundred years, increases
rapidly starting at about year 1000, then levels off ca. 3000
years to approach an equilibrium value.†
From the “lifetime risk” metric, Bradley and Wein derive
a second metric, “sustainable lifetime risk” defined as the
maximum lifetime risk value over all future times. Figure 3
shows how the “lifetime risk” at 200 years (dashed line)
and the “sustainable lifetime risk” (solid curve) vary as a
function of fraction of spacecraft deorbited. The former value
†See p. 1381 of [2] for discussion of differences in long-term predictions
given by this model and Kessler’s 2000 model [15] and differences regarding
active debris removal conclusions relative to those drawn by Liou and
Johnson [16] and [17].
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Fig. 3. Sustainable lifetime risk (solid curve) and risk at 200 years (dashed
line) to an operational spacecraft as a function of fraction of new launches
that deorbit the spacecraft at the end of its operational life. [Bradley and
Wein 2009, Fig. 5, reprinted with permission]
is relatively insensitive and the latter strongly sensitive to
deorbit compliance.‡
From that second metric, Bradley and Wein derive the
measure of harm most directly relevant to our current
purposes, the incremental number of operational spacecraft
destroyed relative to baseline up until time T caused by a
failure to deorbit an “extra” spacecraft (i.e., a launch that
represents a perturbation above baseline launch rate), shown
as “Sn insertion” in Figure 4.§ An interesting feature of
the figure is that actions representing break-ups at T = 0
show the largest peak difference relative to baseline as the
effects of that early breakup cause risk to rise sooner, more
rapidly, and be of longer duration. Launch of a spacecraft or
rocket body without deorbiting capability does not represent
a current break-up but, instead, has an attendant risk of break-
up at some future epoch. These curves, “R insertion” and
“Sn insertion” evidence a smaller and no significant peak in
damage, respectively, relative to baseline.
4) Benefit from Abatement of Harm: We adopt an avera-
ge spacecraft value of $500M, in accordance with Bradley
and Wein. To determine benefit from abatement of harm by
deorbiting a spacecraft, we use Bradley and Wein’s third
metric to calculate the net present value (NPV) of the
incremental cost of operational spacecraft destroyed relative
to baseline, as a function of discount rate (Figure 5):
NPVbenefit = $500M
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
d(damage)
dt
]
dt .
‡Risk at steady state differs from the maximum (i.e., “sustainable lifetime
risk”) only at very high (> 97%) compliance rates; note that Figure 2 shows
risk still increasing 10,000 years from present for a 2/3 compliance rate.
§The subscript “n” signifies an “extra” non-operational spacecraft, i.e.,
a spacecraft not deorbited after operational lifetime; the loss of an “extra”
satellite while still operational is not shown.
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Fig. 4. Damage in terms of operational spacecraft destroyed up until time
T caused by various activities that occur at time 0. Of key interest here
is the “Sn insertion” curve representing harm caused by failure to deorbit
a spacecraft. (Bradley and Wein, 2009, p. 1379) [Bradley and Wein 2009,
Fig. 6, reprinted with permission]
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Fig. 5. Discounted damage from one satellite not being de-orbited
at the end of its life, as a function of annual discount rate. [personal
communication from A. Bradley]
Models in the GHG arena typically compute future harm
for a period of 100 years and adopt discount rates on the
order of 2% [18]. For convenience, we take as baseline a
net present value of $1M consistent with a discount rate of
0.25%.¶
In our model, we set the product of benefit parameters
a b =net present value of benefits from one deorbit=1M .‖
We assume benefit is a nearly linear function of compliance
rate.∗∗ To achieve this, we set the b parameter to 10−8.
We allocate abatement benefits to nations in accordance
with their share of annual launches (Figure 1). Nations with
¶Such discount rates are not inconsistent with those recommended for
valuing “distant” and “far distant” futures. [19]
‖This value is chosen for illustrative purposes. Arguments could be made
for either higher or lower valuations; future work will explore such schemes.
∗∗This assumption is based on Bradley and Wein Fig. 5.
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the greatest exposure (represented here only by their launch
rates) to debris receive the greatest benefit from abatement.
5) Abatement Costs: In keeping with the structure of the
model of McGinty [1] we assume the cost function for each
nation i deorbiting a quantity qi of satellites, is
ciq
2
i
2
.
We suppose that a nation’s marginal costs for deorbiting
any one of its satellite is uniformly distributed between $0
and $1M. Deorbiting costs vary as a function of mass and
other variables, in particular whether a satellite’s mission
already requires it to have maneuvering capabilities. Such
a spacecraft might have a lower additional cost to add de-
orbit capabilities than a satellite that would not otherwise
need to carry fuel and thrusters for its mission. The $0 to
$1M distribution is such that the average cost is $0.5M.††
We assume i) each nation chooses to add deorbit capability
to those satellites for which addition is least costly and ii) the
marginal cost of deorbiting increases linearly as the fraction
of satellites a nation deorbits increases. Thus the marginal
cost has the form $1M × qini , and the total cost has the form
$1M × q2i2ni . Note that, from the latter expression, the total
cost to deorbit all ni of a nation i’s satellites is $0.5 ×niM,
the average deorbit cost times the number of satellites. Our
assumption on the marginal cost is equivalent to assuming
ci =
$1M
ni
. (3)
B. Simulation
The simulation computes global and individual abatement
and profit for the null and full coalition (social optimum)
outcomes. It also computes, for each partial coalition chosen
from the power set of all possible coalitions:
• Profit and abatement by members, and
• Profit by members if they were to leave the coalition.
The simulator then checks stability of each coalition. For
each stable coalition, the simulation computes:
• Transfer payments among members (and member pro-
fits after transfer), and
• Profit and abatement by non-members.
Finally, the simulator identifies those partial coalitions
with the highest global abatement Q, profit Π, and number
of members.
IV. RESULTS
For the simulation of twelve nations with parameterization
as above‡‡, there are 1280 stable coalitions out of 212 =
4096 possible coalitions. The coalition that provides for the
highest global abatement, {1,2,3,10,11,12}, is deemed the
“best partial coalition” in the results below:
††This is the value Bradley and Wein extrapolate (p. 1378) from Wei-
demann, et al (2004) [3] for the cost of deorbiting an “average” spacecraft
(800 kg) from their shell-of-interest (900 to 1000 km).
‡‡a b = $1M, b = 10−8, {αi} from Figure 1, ci = $1Mni
• Figure 6 shows global abatement (deorbits/year) for the
null, best partial, and full coalition cases.
• Figure 7 shows global profit ($M/year) for the null, best
partial, and full coalition cases.
• Figure 8 shows profit garnered by each nation for the
null and best partial coalition cases.
• Figure 9 shows abatement effected by each nation vs.
abatement costs borne by each nation (after transfers)
in the best partial coalition case.
• Figure 10 shows abatement nation-by-nation for the
null and best partial coalition cases, with non-members
displayed on the left and members of the coalition
displayed on the right.
• Figure 11 shows abatement nation-by-nation as a per-
centage of abatement each would be responsible for in
the full coalition case.
• Figure 12 shows profit as a percentage of that each
would be garner in the full coalition case.
0.0 
0.5 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
2.5 
3.0 
Q(∅) Q(Best Partial) Q(Full)  
0.57 1.37 3.00 
Spacecraft  
deorbited 
per year  
from SOI 
Fig. 6. Global abatement for null, best partial, and full coalitions
V. DISCUSSION
The best partial coalition (the best stable coalition) achie-
ves 46% of the abatement of a full coalition (Figure 6).
Recall that the full coalition case is equivalent to a social
0.0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1.0 
1.2 
1.4 
1.6 
Π(∅) Π(Best Partial) Π(Full)  
0.49 0.95 1.50 
$M/y 
Fig. 7. Global profit for null, best partial, and full coalitions
5
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0.020 
0.040 
0.060 
0.080 
0.100 
0.120 
0.140 
0.160 
0.180 
0.200 
4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 10 11 12 
π(∅) 0.010 0.013 0.023 0.025 0.056 0.065 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.070 0.090 0.134 
π(partial) 0.024 0.030 0.055 0.061 0.138 0.162 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.121 0.143 0.190 
$M/y 
Nation 
non-members 
members 
Fig. 8. Profit for null and best partial coalitions
0.0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 10 11 12 
q effected 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.031 0.043 0.009 0.009 0.017 0.253 0.337 0.663 
q costs borne 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.031 0.043 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.211 0.310 0.749 
non-members 
members 
Spacecraft  
deorbited 
per year 
from SOI 
Nation 
Fig. 9. Abatement effected vs abatement costs borne for best partial coalition
optimum that could only be achieved if nations could be
compelled to do what was socially optimal). Moreover, the
best partial coalition achieves 63% of the payoff that a
full coalition would achieve (Figure 7). In this case, the
partial coalition that achieves the highest global abatement
is the same coalition that achieves the highest global profit.
(There are parameter settings for which this is not the case.)
However, the best partial coalition is not the coalition with
the largest membership–there are 7 and 8-member coalitions
that do not perform as well on the other metrics. (The largest
coalition, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12}, executes only 30% of the
full coalition abatement.)
Each member nation achieves a higher profit in the best
partial coalition than they would in the null coalition case
(Figures 8, 12). This confirms that membership in the coali-
tion is consistent with parties’ self-interest (i.e., membership
is “incentive-compatible”).
These profits incorporate transfers between nations. Figu-
re 9 shows abatement effected by each coalition member
in contrast with abatement costs borne by each member.
The difference between these two quantities is the value of
“permits” the member sells (or buys) within the coalition.
In this case, nation 12 (which has the highest exposure
to debris risk and, therefore, gains the most from debris
abatement) pays all the other coalition members to increase
their abatement from the levels they would execute according
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4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 10 11 12 
q(∅) 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.031 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.088 0.342 
q(partial) 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.031 0.043 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.211 0.310 0.749 
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Spacecraft 
deorbited 
per year  
from SOI 
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Fig. 10. Quantity of abatement: null vs best partial coalition
0% 
10% 
20% 
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40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 10 11 12 
q(∅) 1.7% 2.3% 4.0% 4.4% 10.1% 12.0% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 12.8% 17.1% 33.8% 
q(partial) 1.7% 2.3% 4.0% 4.4% 10.1% 12.0% 33.8% 33.8% 34.6% 54.6% 60.2% 74.0% 
non-members 
members 
Abatement  
[% of Full] 
Nation 
Fig. 11. Quantity of abatement: null vs best partial coalition as percent of full coalition
to their individual cost-benefit analyses.
As stated earlier, a is a scaling parameter. Considering
the profit function (Eq. 2) in view of the partial coalition
solution for Q given in Appendix A, one sees that Q ∝ a
and Π ∝ a2. (The same proportionality holds for the null
and full coalition cases.) Therefore, for any fixed value
of b, the scaling derives, in turn, from the product a b =
net present value of benefits from one deorbit:
Q ∝ (NPV of benefits from one deorbit)
Π ∝ (NPV of benefits from one deorbit)2
In the current model, we set the parameter b to the
arbitrarily small value of 10−8 in order to achieve a nearly
linear benefit function.
As can be seen in Figures 10 and 11, all members of the
best partial coalition significantly increase abatement over
the levels they would execute in the absence of any coalition.
Non-members do not reduce their abatement in the presence
of the increased abatement by the coalition.
The independence of abatement behavior by non-members
in our nearly linear case is consistent with prior explorations
of linear benefit function. Consistent with prior research,
as noted by McGinty [1], linear benefit functions result
in orthogonal reaction functions for non-members, so IEA
abatement does not influence non-member abatement (citing
[9], [11], [20]).
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4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 10 11 12 
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% of  
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Fig. 12. Profit: null vs partial coalition as percent of full coalition
The results suggest that, in a debris IEA where benefits
are effectively additive in the regime of interest, active “free-
riding” in the sense of a counter-productive decrease of
non-members abatement to offset an increase in members’
abatement may not be a problem. However, “free-sharing”
of “undeserved” benefits to non-coalition members may be
some psychological impediment to coalition formation. The
extent to which non-members share in coalition benefits can
be seen in Figure 12.
This work presents only a preliminary assessment of an
IEA framework for debris mitigation. A number of issues
remain to be explored to determine appropriateness of this
approach given the special circumstances of the debris pol-
lution problem:
• Explore discretization of abatement actions; variabili-
ty of launch rates; periods of inactivity for selected
players; variability of player sets; heterogeneity of pol-
lution effect; small sample sizes; etc.
• Consider linking IEAs for a set of orbital regimes or
other issues;
• Explore alternative benefit evaluation schemes;
• Elaborate cost dependence of deorbiting with respect to
spacecraft mass, orbit, and maneuvering system design
parameters (e.g., prior inclusion of station-keeping, at-
titude control, collision avoidance capability);
• Incorporate other debris mitigation measures in strategy
space: collision avoidance, solid rocket motor (SRM)
slag prevention, active debris removal, etc.;
• Account for non-catastrophic collisions that disable
collision avoidance or deorbiting capability and for
addition of shielding to protect these capabilities;
• Reflect plausible distributions for launch rates, orbits,
masses, and cross-sections for future launches;
• Address broader set of stakeholder interests: military,
government (non-military), civil, and commercial; non-
spacecraft-owning nations; rogue activity, etc.;
• Incorporate, as benefits, reduced damage to dependent
systems (e.g., national infrastructure, improved national
security);
• Explore uncertainty and learning impacts on coalition
performance;
• Evaluate access to shared Space Situational Awareness
(SSA) collision avoidance resources as an inducement
providing direct benefit for coalition members and in-
direct benefit of protecting the space resource.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This simulation was a successful proof of concept of
an International Environmental Agreement for debris mit-
igation. The results suggest that a coordination mechanism
allowing for transfer payments between self-interested parties
can provide a promising means for increasing abatement
of debris generation. Future work will focus on verifying
and extending these results and addressing the issues raised
above.
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APPENDIX A: AFTER MCGINTY 2007 [1]
For each partial coalition, k, chosen from the power set of
all actors, the global abatement is Q (k) = Qs (k) +Qt (k).
We determine coalition abatement
Qs (k) =
ab
d
∑
i∈k
1
ci
∑
i∈k
αi
by maximizing members’ joint profit, where
d =
[
1 + b
∑
j /∈kθj
]2
+ b
∑
i∈k
1
ci
∑
i∈k
αi ,
Individual member (aka signatory) abatement
qs (k) =
ab
csd
∑
i∈k
αi
is the most efficient allocation according to cost.
Aggregate non-member abatement is
Qt (k) =
ab
d
∑
i∈k
θj
(
1 + b
∑
j /∈kθj
)
and individual non-member abatement is
qt (k) =
ab
d
θt
(
1 + b
∑
j /∈kθj
)
.
APPENDIX B: FROM BRADLEY AND WEIN 2009 [2]
The rates of change for rocket bodies (i.e., upper sta-
ges, since first stages are assumed to deorbit immediately),
spacecraft with deorbit capability, spacecraft that are still but
which do not have deorbit capability, spacecraft that are no
longer operational, and fragments of type κ (hazardous or
benign) from source τ (rocket body or spacecraft) are given
by:
R˙(t) = λR −
∑
α∈Uh
βRαR(t)α(t)− µRR(t)
S˙on(t) = (1− θd)λo −
∑
α∈Uh
βSαS
o
n(t)α(t)− µoSon(t)
S˙n(t) = µoS
o
n(t)−
∑
α∈Uh
βSαSn(t)α(t)− µnSn(t)
S˙d(t) = θdλo −
∑
α∈Uh
βSαSd(t)α(t)− µoSd(t)
F˙κτ (t) =
1
2
∑
α∈U
∑
γ∈U
δτκαγα (t) γ (t)− µFκτ Fκτ (t)
where
λ ≡ launch rate
θ ≡ deorbit rate
µ−1 ≡ average operational lifetime
β, δ ≡ satellite and fragment collision rate parameters
α, γ ∈ satellite types {S,R, Fκτ }
Parameters for the differential equations are expectations
over the same distributions that govern an object-by-object
simulation.
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